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Abstract:  
Despite the fact that living together in the same geography has created many 
similarities for Turkey and Greece over the centuries, both sides are keen to identify, 
even exaggerate, the differences between them and other ‘inferiors’.  In this article we 
look at the role of cultural and ‘scientific’ racism(s) in the formation of Turkish and 
Greek national identities. Both Turkish and Greek identities have been built on 
European-ness at the same time as Greekness and Turkishness.  Therefore, the 
national identities in Turkey and Greece are defined within the context of mainstream 
Eurocentrism, and in that sense the same White European race-ism is shared as the 
essential aspect of Greek and Turkish national characteristics.   
 
Turkey and Greece, being geographically contiguous and historically connected, have 
spent a good deal of their shared history fighting each other, militarily as well as 
politically. Despite the fact that living together in the same geography has created 
many similarities over the centuries, both sides are keen to identify, even exaggerate, 
the differences between them and other ‘inferiors’- ‘narcissism of minor difference’1. 
In this article we look at the role of cultural and ‘scientific’ racism in the formation of 
Turkish and Greek national identities.2 Both Turkish and Greek nationalists define 
their identity within the context of mainstream Eurocentrism, and in that sense they 
share the same White European race-ism as the essential aspect of their nation's 
characteristics.3  
 
Cultures have always compared themselves to each other and were ranked by their 
wealth and their ‘high’ culture. Those classified as ‘inferior’ could improve, become 
less ‘barbarian’ and more ‘civilised’ by assimilating the ‘higher’ culture. However, 
‘scientific’ racism, which has its roots in the 19th century, the notion that one can and 
should establish a social hierarchy based on biological markers, does not allow for 
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that. Discrimination based on biology means that hierarchical rankings are permanent, 
unchanging, because they are ascribed rather than achieved. 
 
 
From the late 19th century,  
 
nations were increasingly differentiated on the basis of their success in 
war, empire-building, colonization, industrialization, population growth, 
science and ‘high culture’. It was a short step to see these rankings as 
reflecting biological determinants.4  
 
 
Social differentiation has been used for inclusion and exclusion throughout history, 
but ‘scientific’ racism and the relationship between culture and race as the principal 
point of differentiation is a modern phenomenon.5 Claims based on biological and 
cultural superiority are often mixed. 
 
The prevailing academic attitude towards national narratives is sceptical: we treat 
nations as constructions based on and fed my myths. What those myths are essentially 
about is differences: in self-perception and identity, and in the perception of others. 
They cover many areas, such as temporal origins, location, ancestry, a heroic age, 
decline and regeneration of the nation.6 Schopflin provides a taxonomy similar to 
Smith’s, when he writes of myths of territory, of redemption and suffering, of unjust 
treatment, myths of election, of military valour, of ethnogenesis and antiquity, and 
myths of kinship and shared descent.7  
 
 
According to Schopflin, myths of election state that 
 
            The nation is question has been entrusted, by God or by History, to perform some 
special mission, some particular function, because it is endowed with unique virtues. 
The Christian origins of this are very evident. In the modern world, the religious motif 
has been transmuted into something secular, like the particular virtue of civility or 
literacyor capacity of modernity or simply neing more ‘European’ than everyone else. 
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This myth then legitimates an assumption of moral and cultural superiority to all 
competitors and rivals and requires them to recognize one’s unique moral worth. 8  
 
 
This paper addresses the ways in which the Greek and Turkish nations have 
constructed and used myths of cultural and biological superiority, cultural and 
scientific racism, to create their own modern identities and to identify their inferior 




The Turks -  ‘White Europeans’ 
When General İlker Basbuğ, the highest ranking officer in 2010, in an interview on a 
popular TV show, defined some citizens as, ‘people who don’t really have Turkish 
blood in their veins,’ he was revealing just the tip of an iceberg.9  General Basbuğ 
here was merely repeating what was established as one of the foundation stones of the 
new ‘modern’ Turkish identity under the founding father of the Turkish Republic, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.  
Ataturk genuinely believed that the root causes of the Ottoman defeat in the First 
World War and its economic decline and political chaos could be found in its cultural 
and religious dynamics, in Islamic and Eastern origins, and therefore the new Turkey 
should cut all its “Eastern/ Muslim” origins adrift and define itself as part of the 
“white/ Western” civilisation. He tried to prove this in many different ways for the 
rest of his life. The Turkish delegation at Lausanne, at the end of the Turkish-Greek 
War in 1922, sought to convince the British, French and Italian delegates that the 
Ankara government had nothing in common with the “old Eastern/ Muslim Turk” 
represented by the Ottoman Empire.10  
What the founders of modern Turkey were trying to do through the way they 
formulated the essential elements of modern Turkish identity was simply respond to a 
strong and deep-rooted set of beliefs and perceptions constructed by the Western 
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powers about the Turks since the 18th century.  The Ottoman Empire, as representing 
the official body of the East, the Orient, of the 19th century, was seen morally, 
religiously and scientifically backward, and its traditional ways and customs became 
objects of derision.  Examples of this way of looking at the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turks, as prototype ‘orientals’, can be seen in many Western texts produced in the 
19th and early 20th centuries.11    
The first attempts to define and describe the Turks as an ethnic group, as part of the 
white European Aryan race(s), are found in the 19th century. These were in line with 
the general ‘scientific’ context of 19th-century Europe, where the concept of race was 
a preoccupation for the growing human sciences. A large number of so-called 
scientific researchers were involved in developing the concept of Aryan supremacy, 
which later fuelled the institutional racism of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s.12  To a 
large extent, Mustafa Kemal’s thinking was influenced by these authors, when he 
initiated his version of Turkish-ness in the 1920s, with the grand design of providing 
some comfort and an extra boost for Turkish national pride and self-esteem which had 
been undermined during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  To serve this purpose, 
history writing was tailored to produce a tool in the search for a positive national 
identity.  From then on started an official process of drafting/ constructing historical 
narratives for the younger generation(s), as well as imposing a new identity from 
above.   
 
The Turkish Historical Society became the major instrument for manufacturing a kind 
of Turkish history, to support the Kemalist version of the new Turkish identity.  As a 
result, a mixture of facts and half-baked comments, and a considerable number of 
simple mistakes were proclaimed official history, and teams of researchers were 
employed to dig out relevant evidence to develop further the main premises of this 
official account.   In a state-sponsored systematic effort, missionary scientists were 
employed to prove the identicalness of the Turkish race and the ‘white’ race by 
verifying that ancient Turks were indeed the real ancestors of modern European 
Aryan race(s).  In doing so, a selective reconstruction of historical events took place 
in order to suppress the Ottoman/ Islamic past and pursue Mustafa Kemal’s specific 
political goal of providing a fresh new start under a ‘white skin’ of Eurocentric flag.  
The central theme of this process, constructing a new Turkish identity, was the 
5  
rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past by glorifying the invented- pre-Islamic past of 
the Turks, and presenting it as the original source of all-white Western history.13 
Hence, the new Turkey, from the start, identified itself directly and immediately with 
the history, culture and perceptions of the western world, claiming a total break with 
the Ottoman and Islamic past. By 1925 an independent Turkish Republic was firmly 
established with its new western institutions and militantly secular modernising 
ideology. A completely new social order was created under the rule of its small 
secular military elite. The events of these early years mark an important watershed in 
the development of Turkish state ideology, which is still dominating most aspects of 
the state institutions and society today.  
In 1932, a Turkish Historical Congress was convened in Ankara with the task of 
proving the theory that all white Aryan races originated in Central Asia (ancient 
Turkish heartland) – i.e. Turks were indeed the real basis of all ‘Western 
civilisation’.  The second Turkish Historical Congress met in Istanbul in 1937, where 
further desperate steps were taken to prove that the Turks were an integral part of the 
group of white European races.   The ‘scientific’ origins of Turkish-ness, blood and 
hereditable ties were debated openly during these two congresses, and an agreement 
was reached on essential purity and supremacy of Turkish blood.  Eugene Pittard, the 
Swiss anthropologist whose work was perceived and practised as a racist account of 
humanity, not only participated but was announced as the honorary president.14  After 
that the new administrative apparatus used ‘race’ as an evaluative criterion for the 
citizens of Turkey. Of course, this was not always the most obvious aspect of 
Kemalist nation-building process.  There was also another level where recognition of 
a citizenship based on universal rights of the entire population was pronounced.  
However, like many other nationalist ideologies of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, the Turkish nation-building process happened within the context of a 
particular hierarchy of races according to which non-Turkish, in particular non-white 
and non-European, groups were considered second class/ inferior compared to the 
dominant group of Turks.15   
The founders of the Turkish Republic accepted this hierarchy of races uncritically and 
tried to present Turks as part of the dominant white group.  During the last 90 years, 
there were numerous occasions where the Republic’s various minorities, non-Muslim 
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groups as well as Muslim Kurds and Alawites,  were considered inferior ‘races’ and 
met with prejudice and discrimination, even open hostility.  It is worth noting that in 
this process the terms ‘Turkish blood’ and ‘Turkish ethnicity’ were being used 
interchangeably in some official documents. 
At the beginning of the republican era, the nation-making project initiated / imposed 
by Mustafa Kemal and his close associates sought to create an ethnically 
homogeneous Turkey, a ‘pure Turkish Turkey.`  The population exchanges between 
Turkey and Greece, as agreed in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, should be considered 
within this context, i.e. clearing Turkey of non-Turkish elements.  The forced Greco-
Turkish population exchange was widely discussed at the heart of ethnic population 
policy. Therefore, it is not surprising that later in the 1930s, in racist German press, 
there was a growing debate on Ataturk’s policies and reforms, and attempts to 
interpret them in connection to the Nazi principle of ethnic homogeneity. The 
perception of Turkey’s ‘ethnically homogeneous’ success story appears quite 
explicitly in Nazi discourse in the interwar period. Being against multi-ethnic entities, 
Nazi commentators praised the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia, from the 1915 Armenian 
deportations (first major brutal act of ethnic cleansing of the 20th century) to the 1923 
Greco-Turkish population exchange, calling for the adaptation of the ‘Turkish 
method’ for an effective  solution to the minority questions.16 
Mustafa Kemal belonged to the generation of officers and administrators who had 
become partially Westernised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  He was 
criticising the ‘Eastern’ in almost exactly in the same terms as any Western 
orientalist.  Mustafa Kemal and his followers believed that Western aggression at the 
end of the First World War was the result of the ‘irrational’ policies of the ‘old’ 
Ottoman regime, which were in turn due to the outmoded mentality of the ‘old Turk’.  
They therefore wanted to ward off Western aggression by ultimately becoming part of 
the powerful Western bloc and adopting Western perceptions, in other words, by 
cutting all links with the ‘old’, the Ottoman.  This can be seen as the victim complex: 
the victimised came to share the philosophy of the oppressor, which was that, among 
the people, there were ‘old’ and ‘new’ and that the key matter was the survival of the 
‘new’.  Thus, the objective of the oppressed people came to be that of joining the 
‘new’, represented by the West. Kemalist nationalism, thus, originated in the 
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misunderstandings and prejudices with which Europeans had long viewed the ‘East’, 
the Oriental, and ‘the Ottoman Turk’.  Like any Western-centric, Orientalist critic, 
Mustafa Kemal always looked upon the Ottoman heritage with disdain, referring to it 
very seldom and then only to condemn that period roundly.  The Ottoman past was 
regarded as representing the ‘antiquated’, ‘medieval’ and ‘decrepit’.  For Mustafa 
Kemal, the Ottoman period had no value, no merit, no authority, and therefore he 
believed that there was to be no relationship between the new Turkey and the old.   
It is now more than 90 years since the establishment of the Republic, and in an ever 
more complex and impersonal society, the limitations and contradictions of Turkish 
national identity are coming to the fore more and more. As Turkey is moving deep 
into the twenty first century, a sense of confusion about ethnicity, nationhood, 
religion, secularity and the country’s role in the world is becoming pronounced. 
Bulent Arinc, Deputy Prime Minister, claimed in a speech in March 2015 that, ‘There 
is no racism in Turkey; it has never found a base for its roots. When we look at 
Europe and other countries we see how far behind us they are, and we feel really 
sorry.’17  However, every Turkish child still grows up memorising Atatürk’s 1927 
address to the youth, which speaks of ‘the noble blood in your veins’ and ‘how happy 
the one who says he is a Turk’.  All primary and secondary schools still teach a 
‘Turkish’ history that starts with the Huns of Central Asia, giving an exclusively 
ethnic, not civic, sense of the nation. Nationalist demagogues still speak of ‘pure 
Turks’ in the country, clearly excluding the Kurds and all non-Muslims, and, more 
recently, Arabs, as the number of Syrian refugees fast increases in the country.  In 
August 2015, Turkey’s controversial President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (then Prime 
Minister), in a televised interview on NTV news network, remarked that being 
Armenian is clearly ‘uglier than even being Georgian’.  He said: ‘You wouldn't 
believe the things they have said about me. I was called a Georgian. I apologise for 
this, but they even said [something] worse: They called me an Armenian.’18   
Discussions of racism take on added importance with the recent influx of Syrian 
refugees in Turkey. Turkish nationalism, like other nationalisms, has many different 
forms that have changed over time and been influenced by internal and external 
conditions. Many Turkish citizens do not accept that there is racism in Turkey, even 
stating that they are proud of their hospitality towards foreigners. Yet, according to 
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recent reports, there is an increasingly high level of harassment and racist attacks 
against Syrian refugees in Turkey.  
Since the start of the civil war in Syria, in March 2011, Turkey has been admitting 
Syrian refugees as part of the “open door” policy, placing them into camps set up in 
provinces on the Turkey-Syria border.  So far Turkey has given refuge to at least 2 
million Syrians, according to UN figures. 19 The Turkish government was initially 
praised for its open-door policy towards Syrian refugees and its humanitarian work in 
its camps. However, it was sharply criticised recently for failing to offer proper 
services and protection to them.   Currently only about one-third of the refugees live 
in the 22 state-run camps, and the authorities do not supply the rest, the remaining 1.4 
million who live outside the camps, with shelter or food. Insults and both open and 
secret racism against the Syrians are all around, in the newspapers and on social 
media. They are considered the criminals of the future. One can see headlines almost 
daily, such as ‘the threat of Syrian beggars’, and warnings about them taking jobs 
from the real citizens, the Turks.20 
In May 2014, when reports came out that Syrians mugged someone in Ankara, local 
people stoned one of the buildings where Syrians lived and set it alight. Violence 
escalated, many were wounded and detained. There is now increasing resentment of 
Syrians everywhere and they are being openly attacked and marginalised on a daily 
basis. There were some serious lynching attempts against Syrians in the border towns 
Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Mardin. Anti-Syrian demonstrations, previously only in 
border towns and cities, now reached Istanbul, Ankara and many other western cities 
where hundreds of Turkish residents, armed with machetes and sticks, attacked Syrian 
refugees, their properties and businesses. Right-wing nationalist groups, together with 
some local gangs, are hunting Syrian refugees in city streets, and when caught their 
prey are badly beaten. Every single day Turkish newspapers are full of such horrific 
incidents.   Media incitement and state inaction make the situation worse.  Syrian 
refugees are presented as criminals, beggars, burglars and prostitutes, unable to adapt 
to Turkish culture. The sad fact is that millions of ordinary Turkish citizens, who are 
not part of such fascist gangs, are just watching such incidents without offering any 





The Greeks –‘The Founders of Europe’ 
 
Nationalism in Greece in the 20th century has been constructed around an ‘other’ than 
has had many faces: a Turkish, a Gypsy, a Macedonian and an Albanian. The Greek 
saying “If you wash the black man you only ruin your soap” is one that betrays an 
attitude towards foreigners of the ‘barbarian’ kind, and has time and time again 
become applicable, when Greece has had to deal with those it considers dirty, 
uncivilised and inferior.  
 
We often talk about ‘the other’ in International Relations, but there are many types of 
‘otherness’. Some are characterised (in the nationalist’s mind) by cruelty, others by 
arrogance and imperialist intentions, others by ignorance, others by inferiority. Not all 
enemies are considered inferior, some are simply regarded as inhuman, cruel, and 
arrogant-- for example the Greek nationalists criticised the Nazis as cruel, but not as 
uncivilised or inferior. What this article addresses is those others that are of the 
‘inferior’ type, those the Greeks see as threats not to its territorial integrity, but to its 
culture and identity. 
 
In order to understand who that other is, we first need to look at the Greek ‘self’, that 
is, we need to understand on what identity Greek nationalism has been built and 
developed over the last two centuries, since the 1821 revolution that led to the 
creation of the modern Greek nation, as Greek positions regarding the Macedonian 
question, as well as the Greek-Turkish enmity, but also its current attitude towards 
Roma and Albanians, reveal the ethno-cultural traditions on which Greek national 
identity is based. 
 
Unlike the modern Turkish national identity that needed to make a break with its 
Ottoman past, in order to stress its modernity and European culture, Greek national 
identity is built on the idea of continuity and unity with the past. For Greeks the past 
is crucial to their national character, as it claims ownership of the Golden Ages of 
Classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire. Myths and collective memories of a 
national community that has remained almost unchanged through history, from 
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antiquity to the present day, through its struggles against invaders to preserve the 
identity of a timeless nation, play the most important role in the construction of itself. 




The historical trajectory of the nation has been traced in a linear 
form and without ruptures or discontinuities from antiquity to 
modernity. Thus, any changes which have marked the past and the 
history of the national community have been re-constructed in such a 




Why has that been so important? Why is genealogical descent going back to antiquity 
so vital to the Greek conception of itself? It is because the achievements of those 
ancient people like Plato, Aristotle, Pericles, Demosthenes, Sophocles and others 
bestow the Greek nation with the gifts of democracy, civilisation, culture, philosophy, 
mathematics, astronomy, the arts… Byzantium is, in addition, the birthplace of 
Christianity for Greeks, whose Greek Orthodoxy has been vital in their modern 
identity formation, their war of independence and their claim to Constantinople, the 
centre of Orthodoxy. 
 
The integration of the past in the present within the Greek concept of 
national identity is manifest also in the Greek language. In Greek, 
the concept of an ethnic group or a nation is described with the 
identical term ethnos which embraces both the pre-modern concept 
of a homogeneous ethnic community and the modern notion of the 
nation as a political community.23  
 
 
For most Greeks, the Greek nation is over 2,000 old, even though there was no Greek 
state for the vast majority of that time. That is because the ethnos does not need a 
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state, but is timeless and not reliant on either territorial, or political sovereignty. 
Rather than Greek it is, in essence, Hellenic. 
 
The model of Greek nationalism was, in fact, France, England and Germany, as an 
imitation of Western Europe would indirectly lead them back to Greek antiquity. In 
the 19th century, Greek nationalism embraced the ideal image Western Europe had of 
Ancient Greece. Thus, its identity was and is its history. Its mission has remained the 
advancement of civilisation.  
 
If the Greek self is cultured, civilised, democratic, learned and European, then the 
other is likely to be uncivilised, ignorant and non-European, if not geographically, 
then culturally. Others like the Turks, the Roma and, in the past 20 years, after the fall 
of Communism, the Macedonians and the Albanians, have been absorbed and 
incorporated into the national narrative to serve as the antithesis to the Greek national 
character. They have been the black man who cannot be cleaned, no matter how much 
soap one uses.  
 
In the last couple of decades negative stereotypes have been constructed and revived 
in the media and by politicians, resulting in xenophobic feelings, as well as a 
narcissism that is typical of a nationalist. The idea that one belongs to a superior 
group not only helps create a positive identity, but also leads to intense narcissism, a 
defence against feelings of weakness and loss of control, status and power, losses that 
threaten identity. This has been the case for Greece, as its attitude towards the 
Albanians reveals. 
 
It all started with the exodus of Albanian refugees in the early 1990s. 
 
At that time, the reasons for leaving the country were mainly 
political, as these people disliked the Communist regime and wished 
for change. At that time the Greek government decided to open the 
borders and issued a large number of visas, in order to let the 
members of the Greek minority reunite with their families over the 
border. Many of whom had been separated for over 40 years. Many 
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ethnic Albanians also crossed the border at this time. Since then, the 
reasons for emigrating have changed, now they are usually economic 
ones rather than political. Greek official policy has also changed.24  
 
The largest group of immigrants to Greece are the Albanians, constituting 63.7% of 
the total documented migrant population. They are also the largest group expelled25: 
 
From 1991 to 1999, 1,820,000 migrants were deported, the majority of them from 
Albania.26 There are also a large number of women and children, even prepubescent 
Albanian girls and boys, who are taken into Greece illegally, to work in the sex 
industry. 
The rise of immigration in the 1990s was seen as a threat to the cultural and ethnic 
purity and authenticity of the nation. The number of Greeks who felt that the number 
of immigrants living in Greece was "too many" skyrocketed, from 29% in 1991, to 
45% in 1992, to 57% in 1993, and 69.2% in 1994.27 Greece is now considered to be 
the European Union’s most xenophobic state. 
Gabriella Lazaridis argues that the Greek media has contributed to these xenophobic 
notions by exaggerating the illegal activities of Albanians, perpetuating the stereotype 
which contributes to the exclusion of Albanian immigrants from economic, social, 
and spatial spheres of Greek life. 28  This leads to the continued exploitation of 
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migrants and foreigners who are seen as "others" and are not afforded the same rights 
as Greek citizens. 
‘The sad truth is that racism and fear against the "Balkan other," personified by the 
economically devastated and desperate Albanian immigrant, is an everyday reality for 
the Greek population’ writes Maria Vidali. ‘Greek insecurities cover a wide spectrum, 
from fears that Albanians might break into houses, stealing and killing, to threats 
against the cultural and blood "purity" of the Greek population, and fears for the 
potential formation of a minority of ethnic Albanians in Greece’.29  
In the collective Greek consciousness, Albanian is synonymous with dangerous, 
impure, uncivilised, ignorant, dirty and inferior. Balkan, rather than European. In the 
1990s it became an insult to call someone ‘Albanian-looking’, as it had always been 
an insult to say someone looked ‘like a Gypsy’, for it meant that the person was dirty-
looking, ugly, unkempt and morally suspect. A person on the periphery of civilised 
society 
‘The hysteria directed against Albanian immigrants has been created and continually 
revived by the Greek media,’ argues Vidali. As a result, Albanians have been attacked 
because of their nationality and ‘even Greeks have been attacked for looking like 
Albanians’.30  
 
A report by the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance, reveals that racial prejudice and violence against migrants persist in 
Greece, despite a new anti-racism law coming into effect in 201431  
"Despite steps forward – including the enactment of a new anti-racism 
law – problems persist, including worrying levels of xenophobia and 
violence against refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and the 
ongoing segregation of Roma children in some schools," ECRI head 
Christian Ahlund said as quoted in a statement on Human Rights 
Europe website.32  
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These ‘others’ are not welcome, for they can only pollute Greek society. European 
brothers and sisters, who are not inferior to the Greeks, are welcome to live, work and 
own property in the country. The English, German, French, Spanish, Italian etc. are 
not barbarians, but fellow Europeans, with a culture not unlike the Greek, which is, 
after all, the ‘cradle of Europe’, for the Greeks are the founders of west European 
civilisation, according to the national narrative. 
The concept of the ‘barbarian’ as the antithesis to the Greek is ever-present in Greek 
nationalism and the Albanian is it. 
 
The intense narcissism, defence against feelings of weakness and loss of control and 
status Greece has been experiencing, has led to the rise of Golden Dawn, a far-right, 
neo-Nazi political party, that came third in the last election, gaining 17 parliamentary 
seats. The party’s popularity soared when the financial crisis rocked Greece in 2009-
2010, when feelings of weakness and insecurity rose. Golden Dawn appealed to many 
due to its "superior race" ideology and aggression towards immigrants. The 
xenophobic messages found fertile ground among the impoverished and powerless, as 
they articulated what many of them had been feeling since the 1990s, when Greece 
was ‘invaded’ by those who had no place in Greek society. 
 
The last few years have been very hard for Greece. There have been severe social 
problems, as well as economic, partly due to the influx of migrants from outside the 
European Union. In reality, this xenophobia is not surprising, given the nature of 
Greek nationalism and the rising insecurity of both state and society.  
 
Martin Jacques, writing about race, argues 
Every race displays racial prejudice, is capable of racism, carries 
assumptions about its own virtue and superiority. Each racism, 
furthermore, is subtly different, reflecting the specificity of its own 
culture and history (…) there is a global racial hierarchy that helps to 
shape the power and the prejudices of each race. At the top of this 
hierarchy are whites (…) Being white confers a privilege, a special kind 
of deference (…) The existence of a de facto global racial hierarchy 
helps to shape the nature of racial prejudice exhibited by other races 
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(…) A race generally defers to those above it in the hierarchy and is 
contemptuous of those below it.33  
 
Similarly, Greek nationalists regard the Greek nation as being quite high on 
the hierarchy, as it is white, Christian, European and with a long glorious 
history and intellectual tradition on which European civilisation is founded. 
Considering themselves to be above the Albanian in the pecking order, as 
they are above the Turk, the Gypsy and the Balkan Slav, they are 
contemptuous of them. In contrast, to those they consider their equals, if not 
their superiors, they are not so. The recent economic crisis was a stark 
example of this, as the Greeks, no matter how resentful they were towards 
‘Europe’ and Germany in particular, they were neither contemptuous nor 
belittling in their attitude towards them. On the contrary, they were outraged 
that their ‘equals’, those belonging to the same white, civilised, European 
club, would treat them so harshly and so unfairly, that they would be so 
ungrateful to them –the Greeks, the nation that gave them the tools to be who 
and where they are today. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that many Turkish and Greek citizens do not accept that there is 
racism in their respective counties, as they state that they are proud of their hospitality 
towards foreigners, racism is visible everywhere and a deep-rooted everyday racism 
dominates Turkish and Greek media and social media.  Public discourses against 
others and minorities are based on a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality. When people identify 
themselves as a member of a particular group, they do not feel comfortable with 
others.  The Turkish and Greek public’s concerns about minorities and refugees are to 
do with culture, values and sustainability. 
Religious minorities, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Yazidis and Syrians, along with 
African and Middle Eastern migrants, face constant discrimination that has erupted 
into violence on several occasions in recent Turkish history.  Kurds have suffered 
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years of discrimination against their cultural and national identity, also well 
documented. They are subject to hate speech and threats almost on a daily basis. The 
latest event was the hundreds of attacks on the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic 
Party during the June election campaign.  Alevis not only face discrimination, but also 
fear persecution on multiple levels every day, including several recent instances of 
their houses being marked, all over Turkey.  On top of these, a bizarre anti-China 
sentiment suddenly swept over Turkey in the summer of 2015.  At the beginning of 
July, a Chinese restaurant in Istanbul was attacked by men with sticks and 
stones. ‘We do not want a Chinese restaurant here, get out of our town!’ the men were 
heard saying.  On 4 July, in the western city of Balikesir, a group protested against 
China for persecuting Uighur Turks and hung an effigy of late Chinese leader Mao 
Zedong.  On the same day, a group of nationalist activists attacked a Korean tourist, 
whom they assumed was Chinese, in the popular tourist district of Sultanahmet, 
Istanbul.  On 9 July, Thailand’s honorary consulate in Istanbul was attacked by 
200 men, apparently mistaking it for Chinese.34  
In Greece, recently the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn is dominating discussions on 
racism.  Yet this focus on Golden Dawn as the locus of racism in Greece is rather 
misleading.  A much deeper and widespread racism, institutionalised through the 
actions of the Greek state, should be an even greater cause for concern.  Of all the 
minorities and migrants in Greece- Muslim Turks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Poles, 
Kurds and other Middle Eastern migrants, Africans, Pakistanis, etc, the Albanians are 
the least valued.  The frenzy directed against Albanian immigrants has been advanced 
and continually reinforced by the Greek media. Quite often Greek television channels 
and newspapers have presumed that all criminals were Albanians, without actually 
having any proof.  Many ordinary citizens in Greece casually use offensive names and images to describe Albanians.  Greek newspapers often carry anti-Albanian and anti-immigrant letters and headlines. An Albanian boy, whose top grades had earnt him the right to carry the Greek flag at a national parade, was prevented from doing so after nationalist protests.35  
 
During a very popular talk show on Greek television, ‘Apo Kardias’ (From the Heart), 
I watched with great interest, followed by mounting horror, as an Albanian couple, 
residents of Greece, sat sadly on stage and in fluent Greek explained their problems 
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and those of their family. They had lived in the country for many years, where they 
had worked and raised their children. When they had finished, the host looked at them 
and asked “Why should I help parasites like you?” With downcast eyes and shoulders 
stooped, the couple had no answer. They suddenly seemed ashamed to be there. The 
studio audience applauded. The show continued to run, hosted by the same man. “If 
you wash the black man you only ruin your soap.” No matter how long those people 
lived in Greece, no matter how well they spoke the language, no matter how many 
children of theirs they christened in the Greek Orthodox faith, they could never be 
Greek, or as good as the Greeks. Change of culture was not enough, because they 
could not change their inferior status, which was/is biological, unchanging, 
permanent. Had they been French, Italian, Dutch, Austrian, or other white European 
high on the sociobiological hierarchy, they would never have been called or thought 
of as parasitic. 
 
The ‘other’ this paper has focused on is the inferior other: the uncivilised, backward, 
lesser other, the other that can only contaminate the dominant culture, the society and 
bloodline of the ‘better’ nation. Turkey and Greece have had such others, as we saw, 
outsiders in society, remaining outsiders even after years of attempted assimilation. 
The Greek and Turkish national narratives are White European. The Eurocentrism of  
their national consciouness has led to the severing of its ties with a non-European 
past, in one case, and to the emphasis on a continuing history and unity with a 
European past, in the other. So one has defined itself as a modern European nation, 
the other as an ancient European nation –the founder of Europe. In both cases their 
relation to the past serves as the basis for Europeanness. In effect then, we see dual 
identities: Turkish/European, Greek/European. 
 
The concept of Europeanness of course involves selecting and appraising specific 
‘European’ characteristics. Those inevitably depend on one’s perspective. British 
nationalists, for instance, see ‘European values’ as belonging to those on the other 
side of the Channel, and look at them less favourably. The entire Balkans are by some 
condemned to stay “Europe that yet has to become Europe”. 36  Despite different 
perspectives, common European values and characteristics, accepted by those nations 
and states that define themselves as European, include human rights, rationality, 
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modernity, democracy, the rule of law, equality and a capitalist economic system. 
Moreover, European means white.  
 
What European does not mean is poor, immigrant, uncivilised, eastern, backward, 
non-democratic. Greek and Turkish identities have been built on Europeanness at the 
same time as Greekness and Turkishness. Their purity and status as higher races relies 
both on their specific national purity and superiority, and on their partaking of a high 
European culture. It is a mixture of cultural and ‘scientific’ racism that aims to 
exclude permanently those lesser ‘others’ who attempt to pollute and destroy their 
national identity. 
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